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Philadelphia,  1782- 1809 
Two capital banks operating in one city . . . might, 
perhaps, act in opposition to each other and, of 
course, destroy each other.-Pelatiah  Webster (1786). 
The founders of commercial banking in this country doubted seriously 
that several banks in one community could get along together, espe- 
cially that the initial bank could survive if one more intruded upon its 
domain. They reasoned that each new bank would embarrass the es- 
tablished institutions by drawing on their specie reserves to build up 
its own.  A corollary of this argument for monopolistic banking was 
that each newcomer must of necessity reduce the profits of the others. 
But  in  Philadelphia, the home of the country’s first bank, it was 
demonstrated-as one rival after another opened its doors in the face 
of the opposition of older institutions-that  competition did not impede 
their growth. Yet no sooner did a bank win friendly recognition from 
its elders than it fell prey to the same fear of newcomers. In New York 
and Baltimore (and possibly also in Boston),’ as in Philadelphia, a new 
institution was looked upon as a threat to the security of intrenched 
banking interests.  Only after considerable experience did the banks 
learn how to minimize the impact of the immediate repercussions of 
the establishment of another bank, and also how to conduct themselves 
in their relations with it. This experience, its effects lightened by an 
expanding demand for bank accommodations and fortuitous accretions 
to their specie holdings, made the banks generally realize that a com- 
petitor’s advent did not necessarily mean their eclipse. 
1.1 
In May  1781, when the Continental Congress approved the estab- 
lishment of the Bank of  North America, it recommended that, for the 
duration of the war, no other banking institution be chartered by any 
state. There was nothing, however, in the charter granted the Bank of 
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North America in March 1782, to suggest that it had been accorded an 
exclusive right to banking in Pennsylvania either during or after the 
war. Yet, for a decade after the war ended, the bank was able to preserve 
its monopolistic position in both Philadelphia and the state.2 
Early in 1784 the Bank of North America was faced with the prospect 
of  a rival.  The first two years of  its existence had been extremely 
profitable; it paid 82 percent on its shares in 1782 and 144  percent in 
1783.3 This handsome return  in itself was  sufficient inducement  for 
others to engage in banking, but there was another motive. The closed 
character of the ownership of the bank’s stock and its board member- 
ship gave rise to an opposition group among the merchants. Quaker 
businessmen in Philadelphia were excluded from bank proprietorship 
and claimed that the directors’ partiality  to insiders prevented them 
from obtaining bank loans. 
Their demands evidently compelled the Bank of North America to 
issue more shares. Meeting on January 12, 1784, stockholders agreed 
to sell one thousand additional shares at $500 each (although the par 
value of the original shares was $400) and to treat the new and the old 
shares as equaL4  If we can  judge by what Thomas Willing, the president 
of the bank, wrote William Bingham, his son-in-law, before the stock- 
holders’ meeting, the subscription was intended only for outsiders dur- 
ing the first six months: “. . .  you’ll be excluded as well as myself from 
any more shares before the  1st Aug. next  . . . unless you get some 
other person to act for you in the Matter.”5 But when the sale of the 
new shares started, they were offered to stockholders as well as to the 
general public. 
The terms of  the proposed  increase in the bank’s capital did not 
cancel plans, announced nine days after the stockholders’ meeting, for 
a new institution, to be known as the Bank of Pennsylvania.  Shares 
were priced at 400 Spanish milled dollars. On February 5, when seven 
hundred shares had been subscribed and apparently paid for,6  the hold- 
ers elected a board of directors, composed mainly of Quaker merchants 
whom the opposition press satirically dubbed  “rigid Presbyterians,” 
“unshaken Quakers,”  and “furious Tories.”’  On February 10 the sub- 
scribers applied to the Assembly for a charter, and the petition was 
favorably received by the committee to which the matter was referred. 
When the legislature tabled a request of  February 26 by the Bank of 
North America to be heard in opposition to the new charter, and two 
days later appointed a committee to bring in a  the bank hastily 
called a stockholders’ meeting for March 1. 
The meeting passed a resolution increasing the amount of the new 
subscription from one thousand to four thousand shares and reducing 
the price to $400. Those who had subscribed to five hundred shares at 
$500 per share were to be refunded the difference. In a statement to 
the  public-signed  by  Willing;  James  Wilson,  counsel;  Thomas 5  The Beginning of Competitive Banking in Philadelphia 
FitzSimons  and  Gouverneur  Morris,  stockholders-the  original ad- 
vance in the price of the shares was defended. It was claimed that the 
price was now reduced not out of private considerations but in the 
public interest, since a new bank would injure cornmer~e.~ 
The bank’s revised stock offer appeased the discontented merchants 
who had planned forming a rival institution. On March 16, when the 
bill creating the Bank of Pennsylvania was reached, its directors ob- 
tained leave to withdraw their application for a charter.  lo The general 
subscription to the Bank of North America was so well received that 
by the end of March its capital, though less than half of the possible 
$2 million, had more than doubled. One hundred and thirty new stock- 
holders  subscribed  six hundred  shares; the rest were  taken by  old 
stockholders or those who had subscribed before March 1.” 
The Bank of North America’s anxiety about the scheme to establish 
another bank cannot be  explained  simply in terms of the supposed 
effects that sharing the market would have on its profits, although that 
apprehension was undoubtedly at the root of its opposition.  It also 
feared for its specie holdings.  Subscribers to the proposed  Bank of 
Pennsylvania could pay for their shares with specie in general circu- 
lation or with Bank of North America notes. Most of them had chosen 
the latter. As its notes were at once presented for redemption, the Bank 
of  North America was drained of gold and silver. William Seton, the 
cashier of the proposed Bank of New York, who was visiting in Phil- 
adelphia, wrote to Alexander Hamilton on March 27: “Gold and silver 
had been extracted in such amounts that discounting was stopped, and 
for this fortnight past not any business had been done at the bank this 
way. . . .  Therefore, for the safety of the community at large, it became 
absolutely necessary to drop the idea of a new bank, and to  join hand 
in hand to relieve the old bank from the shock it has received.”12 
Hamilton, who had originally favored the incorporation of the Bank 
of Pennsylvania, now saw the competition in a different light. He wrote 
Gouverneur Moms: “I had no doubt that it was against the interests 
of the proprietors; but, on a superficial view, I perceived benefits to 
the community, which, on a more close inspection, I found were not 
rea1.”I3 Robert Morris, concluding that there was not enough capital 
in the country to support several banks, wrote Jefferson on April 8, 
1784: “The establishment of so many banks, instead of aiding credits 
and facilitating operations, will for some time to come have a contrary 
effect, and it is not without great difficulty that they will each collect 
a capital sufficient to support its own operations. The struggle to get 
such capital places these institutions in a degree of opposition to each 
other injurious to them all.”I4 
At the time Morris was writing, exports of specie exceeded imports, 
owing to an unfavorable balance of trade and the payment of the claims 
of English creditors for debts contracted before the war.I5 The con- 6  Anna J. Schwartz 
sequent tightening of the specie supply seemed to confirm his gloomy 
foreboding that the creation of a new bank would lead to disaster. But 
he knew, as he indicated two years later, that the flow of specie from 
this country would soon be reversed.16 When the balance of interna- 
tional payments shifted in our favor, gold and silver were bound to 
become more generally available. Morris’ argument against a new bank 
had at best only temporary cogency. 
A real fallacy was his assumption that a new bank could obtain specie 
for its reserve only from the vaults of the preexisting institution.  He 
ignored the fact that only a fraction of the country’s specie was held 
by the Bank of North America; that if  a rival drew on its reserve, it 
could hope that is holdings would be replenished by deposits of gold 
and silver in the public’s posse~sion.~~ 
Had the Bank of Pennsylvania’s capital consisted entirely of Bank 
of North America notes and had there been no transfer to it of specie 
held by the public in strong boxes, the Bank of North America might 
indeed have suffered by the redistribution of its holdings.18 But if we 
assume that the credit supply would have been more rationally  dis- 
tributed when two banks instead of one were in operation, the com- 
munity might have benefited from the opening of a second bank even 
if it added no specie to the amount already in vault and the total credit 
supply remained unchanged. 
The proposition against competitive banking generally, as stated by 
Morris,  seems indefensible. Specie kept in strong boxes would have 
found its way to the new bank, presumably just as it did to the older 
bank when it increased its capital. If enough capital could not be scraped 
together for two banks, as Morris asserted, it is difficult to understand 
how the subscription of the older bank was doubled.19 
In short, the crux of the Bank of North America’s opposition to a 
potential competitor was concern over its specie holdings, but, had its 
relations with the Bank of Pennsylvania been amicable, an agreement 
would have been reached at the outset concerning the acceptance of 
each other’s notes. And the run on the Bank of North America for 
specie, described by Seton, might have been avoided. 
1.2 
During the decade 1784-93 the Bank of North America modified its 
attitude. On its own initiative it established good relations with out-of- 
state banks and submitted, willingly or unwillingly, to the authority of 
the Bank of the United States. And when the legislature chartered a 
second bank in  1793, the Bank of North America discovered that its 
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At the same time that it was resisting local bank competition, it was 
encouraging the founding of banks outside Pennsylvania. To help Bos- 
ton merchants who proposed opening the Bank of Massachusetts, Will- 
ing in January 1784 described his experience in running his bank. In 
March, Seton went to Philadelphia bearing a letter of introduction from 
Hamilton to FitzSimons, requesting his advice concerning the opera- 
tion of a bank.20 
Thus, while the management of the Bank of North America looked 
upon another bank in Philadelphia as an interloper, it tolerated banks 
outside the state, even admitting that they might be useful: first, be- 
cause subscriptions to a bank in Boston or New York were not likely 
to be paid for in Philadelphia bank notes that would recoil on the issuer; 
second, the banks would operate within their own local markets, with- 
out affecting the demand for and supply of loans in Philadelphia; third, 
they would accommodate Bank of North America customers who had 
payments or collections to make in their vicinity.21  In contrast to its 
behavior toward a newcomer in Philadelphia, the Bank of North Amer- 
ica’s relations with banks in other cities were exemplary. 
The smooth course of the organization of the Bank of the United 
States in  1791 afforded other evidence of how harmoniously the situ- 
ation might have been managed in Philadelphia in  1784. By opening 
the subscription books for the national bank, the Bank of North Amer- 
ica surprised the skeptics who expected it to be antagonistic; Willing 
was  one of  the commissioners.22 Philadelphians subscribed heavily; 
some even were disappointed, so keen was the demand for share~.~3 
There must have been repercussions on the specie holdings of the Bank 
of North America, but when Willing was chosen to head the national 
bank, it became obvious that a modus vivendi would be found.24 The 
Bank of the United States opened on December 12, 1791. On February 
6, 1792, the Bank of North America adopted a resolution providing for 
a  daily exchange of  notes with it and on March 23 one providing for 
the appointment monthly of  a committee of  three to consult with a 
similar committee from the Bank of the United States, “for the purpose 
of communicating freely upon the business of both, as well to prevent 
improper interference with each other as to promote the accommo- 
dation of the  citizen^."^^ 
The attitude of an elder sister institution toward a newcomer in the 
local banking field was  of  crucial importance.  Its opposition  to the 
proposed Bank of Pennsylvania in 1784 had caused a crisis in the Bank 
of North America’s affairs. But, because the state bank cooperated, 
all went smoothly when the first Bank of the United  States was or- 
ganized.26  Yet it lost some local business as well as the accounts of the 
federal government, which had been exceedingly profitable. The ser- 
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order were acknowledged to be more important than any possible loss 
its competition might 
Whether Bank of North America stockholders suffered is proble- 
matical. The bank paid 13Y2  percent in 1791, 12Y2 percent in 1792, 12 
percent for the next six years, and never less than 9 percent as long 
as the first Bank of the United States was in existence.28  However, in 
July 1792, after an exceedingly good year, the dividend committee of 
the Bank of North America recommended a payment at a lower rate 
than the bank’s financial situation warranted. Taking for granted that 
the competition of the new bank would lower profits, it warned that 
another dividend at a high rate might raise false hopes which would 
have to be dashed. But the committee had an ulterior motive in urging 
a low rate:  “Another  probable  consequence of  two successive high 
dividends deserves consideration; would it not be likely to induce oth- 
ers to engage in a business that yielded so large a profit, and if  the 
Legislature of the State had an advantageous offer made to them, would 
they not be likely to grant another charter?”29  Preventing the creation 
of a new bank meant holding the legislature as well as the commercial 
elements in the community at bay. 
At this time a Treasury surplus challenged the attention of Pennsyl- 
vania state authorities. After the entire public debt had been liquidated 
from the proceeds of sales of public lands and paid-up back taxes, a 
tidy sum remained unappropriated.  The high dividends paid on bank 
stock attracted notice in political quarters. Governor Mifflin on August 
13, 1792, proposed to subscribe, on behalf of the commonwealth, to a 
substantial quantity of Bank of North America stock.’O  On January 29, 
1793, the stockholders agreed to admit the state on terms to be set by 
a committee to be appointed to confer with the governor.31 Its offer 
seems to have been a $750,000 subscription at the rate of $400 for each 
share, half to be borrowed from the bank.32 
The negotiations were unsuccessful.  Merchants, perhaps because 
they were dissatisfied with their accommodation at the Bank of North 
America and the Bank of the United States, seized on the political 
circumstance of the state’s search for an investment for its surplus to 
promote a bank.33  The state struck a bargain with the new institution, 
the Bank of Pennsylvania, which it incorporated for twenty years on 
March 30 and used thereafter as its fiscal agent. To the bank’s author- 
ized capital of $3 million the governor subscribed $1 million on behalf 
of the state, paying part with public stock of the federal government 
owned by the state at the value fixed by the legislature; part in specie; 
and the rest with the proceeds of a $250,000 loan from the bank.34 
Possibly in deference to the view that a competitor would impair the 
profitability of the Bank of North America, the Bank of Pennsylvania’s 
charter stipulated that two thousand shares at $400 each should be set 
aside for Bank of North America stockholders, if they decided to re- 9  The Beginning of Competitive Banking in Philadelphia 
linquish their charter within three months after it was granted. The 
Bank of North America turned down this suggestion; evidently a year 
and a half’s profitable operation alongside the Bank of the United States 
had changed its views on competitive banking.35 It had no cause to 
regret the decision to retain its identity.  “It appears . . . that estab- 
lishment of the Bank of Pennsylvania hath not upon the whole lessened 
the business, but hath increased it in several departments,” reported 
a committee appointed by the directors of the Bank of North America 
to examine the possibility of reducing the staff.36 
There is no evidence that the Bank of North America and the Bank 
of Pennsylvania did not get on well. The Bank of the United States 
also established friendly relations with the new bank, including it in 
the arrangement for the daily settlement and exchange of notes. A joint 
committee of the three banks, meeting on March 2, 1797, adopted the 
rule that “after March 3  1, all bills made payable at sight or on demand 
must be paid on the same day they are presented” and agreed that no 
bank would discount a note from which the qualifications  “without 
defalcation” or “without set-off’’ were omitted. Joint action was pro- 
posed in June when the Bank of North America appointed a committee 
to meet with committees which the Bank of the United States and the 
Bank of Pennsylvania might appoint “to attend to the bill depending 
before the House of Representatives of the United States for levying 
a stamp duty and to report their opinion thereon.”  Committees from 
the three banks conferred again in May 1799 on “the prevailing distress 
of the mercantile interests of this city.”37 
The older institutions probably could not risk harassing a rival with 
which the state was identified; moreover, they were no doubt learning 
that mutual trust was a sine  qua non of a successful banking community. 
The regularization of interbank relations was a prerequisite to the ex- 
pansion of credit merchants required for the carrying trade. Mercantile 
houses  combining importing and exporting  multiplied as the Napo- 
leonic wars, until the embargo period, opened business opportunities 
for Americans. The shipment of colonial produce to the several bellig- 
erent mother-countries-as  well as its purchase for their own account 
in the French, Spanish, and Dutch colonies-engaged the energies of 
a growing merchant  class.  American firms also imported  European 
manufactures, especially British, and the manufactures and produce of 
the East Indies and China for re-export to the West Indies, the Spanish 
colonies in South America, and Europe. They got the British products 
on longterm credits but-in  order to purchase ships and domestic pro- 
duce and also to speculate in land and securities-had  to borrow from 
American banks.38 
Without an effective banking  community,  ambitious businessmen 
during the Napoleonic era would not have been able to go so far as 
they did. Interbank claims were inevitable; and the merchant business 10  Anna J. Schwartz 
order could not thrive unless banks trusted one another. City banks, 
not only in Philadelphia but also in other coastal cities where merchants 
organized banks to further their business interests, had to accept and 
adapt themselves  to competitive banking. Their compliance was re- 
luctant. Despite the experience afforded by the formation of the Bank 
of the United States and the Bank of Pennsylvania,  “Civis”  noted in 
the Aurora General Advertiser on December 21,  1801:  “On the pro- 
priety of establishing a banking house there exist various sentiments; 
without at present hazarding an opinion upon it, I can venture to say, 
that the banks now in this city will not approve the establishment. 
From  this  quarter  there  will  presumably  proceed  the  greatest 
opposition.” 
1.3 
When the Philadelphia Bank began operations as an unincorporated 
association in September  1803, the wisdom its predecessors had ac- 
quired in interbank relations was put to the test. Merchants who had 
gone into business for themselves after the start of  the Napoleonic 
wars, and who claimed that they were being unfairly treated by the 
banks,  had a prominent  share in  the new institution’s  organization. 
Designed to appeal to men of smaller means than those who had in- 
vested in the older banks and were their customers, its shares were 
priced at $100. The strength of investors’ demands may be gauged from 
the ease with which the new bank accumulated capital. By December 
31, 1803, $1 million was fully paid in.39 
To  avoid antagonizing other banks in the city the Philadelphia Bank 
received and paid out their notes along with its own. Yet  the other 
banks refused to reciprocate.40 On September 21 the board of directors 
of the Philadelphia Bank resolved: “That so long as the Banks of the 
United States, Pennsylvania,  and North America continue to refuse 
the notes of this Bank, that the Cashier apply every day to the said 
Banks for Specie in exchange for such of their notes as may be on 
hand in this Bank.”41 This retaliation  brought to heel all except the 
Bank  of  Pennsylvania,  which  continued prey  to the fears that  had 
exercised the Bank of North America a decade earlier. “Anti-Monop- 
oly” wrote: “That the Pennsylvania Bank is opposed to the policy and 
prosperity of Pennsylvania is obvious-for  though they have refused 
the paper of the Philadelphia Bank, the Banks of Boston, Hartford, 
New York, Baltimore,  Delaware,  and Alexandria accept them-and 
their acceptance was voluntary. Jealousy and the spirit of monopoly 
of the Pennsylvania Bank opposes the credit of citizens of Philadel- 
~hia.”~2  Before its quarters offered suitable protection, the Philadelphia 
Bank had placed a box of money for safekeeping in the Bank of Penn- 11  The Beginning of Competitive Banking in Philadelphia 
sylvania. As a rebuke to the latter it now moved the box to the Bank 
of the United States and ordered Bank of Pennsylvania notes to be 
presented for redemption immediately upon their receipt. 
In this atmosphere of uncertain  acceptance by  the local banking 
fraternity, the Philadelphia Bank applied to the legislature for a charter 
on December 13.43  This action put the state in a dilemma: as a stock- 
holder in the Bank of Pennsylvania, its interests presumably coincided 
with those of the private investors in the bank, but as arbiter of the 
public welfare, it had to consider the views of the promotors of the 
Philadelphia  Bank.  These conflicted with the ambitions  of  Bank  of 
Pennsylvania  stockholders. The contradictions implicit in the state’s 
position were stated in a resolution read in the House at a later date: 
Whereas, the intimate connexion and union of pecuniary interests 
between a government and great monied institutions, tends to create 
an influence, partial to the latter and highly injurious to the former. 
It being the duty of government to consult the general will and pro- 
vide for the good of all, embarrassments must frequently be thrown 
in the way of the performance of this duty, when the government is 
coupled  in  interest  with  institutions whose rights  are founded in 
monopoly,  and  whose  prosperity  depends  on the  exclusion  and 
suppression of  similar institutions. The government in such cases 
becomes identified with these establishments, and the means of pro- 
moting and extending commerce, manufactures and agriculture equally 
over the whole state for the general good are too often lost sight of 
by this dangerous and unnatural union.44 
In resolution of these conflicting interests a committee appointed by 
the Philadelphia Bank’s stockholders made various proposals to com- 
pensate the state for the charter: to pay $15,000 outright for a ten-year 
charter or $20,000 for a fourteen-year  charter.  For a fourteen-year 
charter it offered alternative terms: The bank would agree to lend the 
state $100,000 for three years, without interest, “on condition that if 
the legislature should, at any time hereafter, impose a tax on banks, 
that the interest so remitted should be considered as a set off  against 
any tax which the legislature might be disposed to lay on this institu- 
tion.”  Finally, it suggested that the legislature authorize a $500,000 
subscription to its stock, payable in Bank of Pennsylvania stock held 
by the state, at par, on the transfer of which the Philadelphia Bank 
would pay by June 1804 $125,000 in specie as a premium.45 
The House committee, under the chairmanship of Adcock, to which 
the Bank of Philadelphia’s petition was referred, favored the fourth 
proposal because it contained the largest spot-cash offer and did not 
impair the state’s equity in the banking business. Although the com- 
mittee was unwilling to express an opinion regarding the ultimate effects U  Anna J. Schwartz 
of the “multiplication  of Banks”  on the general public interest, it ap- 
proved the petition for inc~rporation.~~ 
On December  17, the day after Adcock’s committee reported, six 
Bank of Pennsylvania directors (including Matthew Carey) appointed 
by the legislature sent a letter to both houses requesting that nothing 
be done about chartering a new  bank  until  a memorial then being 
prepared was laid before them.  They asserted that another bank in 
Philadelphia would “materially injure the property of the state in the 
Bank of Pennsylvania, and the interest of the community at large. We 
also believe there are no terms on which a charter could be granted, 
that would compensate the state for the injury it would sustain thereby.”47 
The memorial duly submitted by the Bank of Pennsylvania on Decem- 
ber 29 stated: “Immense injuries must inevitably arise to the institution 
and the state, should the legislature incorporate the said bank.”48 
The House had postponed a second reading of the Adcock report 
but, when the Bank  of  Pennsylvania submitted its protest, referred 
both the report and it to a new committee,  for which Maclay  was 
spokesman.49 Aware of the pressure the Bank of  Pennsylvania was 
bringing to bear on the legislature, the Philadelphia Bank revised its 
four proposals with a view to making them more attractive.50 
The Maclay  committee reported  on January 20 against the incor- 
poration of  the Philadelphia Bank. It argued that more banks would 
mean smaller profits for all and hence reduce the value of  the state’s 
investment in the Bank of Pennsylvania. No premium which the Phil- 
adelphia Bank might pay for a charter could offset this loss. The com- 
mittee, furthermore, was skeptical of the bank’s ability to live up to 
its proposals and doubted the accuracy of its valuation of the various 
premiums:  “Banks already chartered . . . are fully competent to the 
business of the state and . . .  [their] protection, more especially of that 
one where the property of the state is lodged, is of more utility . . . 
than the chartering of new ones.”” 
Having disposed of the Philadelphia Bank’s application, the Maclay 
committee indorsed a measure proposed by the Bank of Pennsylvania. 
If the state would extend its charter for fourteen years beyond  1813 
(the expiration date under the act of incorporation), the Bank of Penn- 
sylvania would pay the state $200,000 in specie or bank notes.5z  During 
this time (a) no other bank (except the Bank of North America) should 
be chartered by the state; (b) no incorporated association with more 
than ten members in Philadelphia or within the state of  Pennsylvania 
should be permitted to carry on banking or issue notes; (c) stockholders 
should be personally liable for the debts of an unincorporated company; 
(d)  the Bank of Pennsylvania should not be subject to taxation. 
The House took no immediate action on the Maclay report. In the 
Senate a resolution was introduced  on January 24  to discharge the 
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petition.53 The chances for a charter looked slim. The stockholders of 
the Philadelphia Bank, however, again memorialized the House, pre- 
senting three rejoinders to the Maclay report: (a) the paid-in capital 
proved that the bank was fully capable of carrying out any proposals 
it had made; (b) as its specie holdings equaled its circulation, the bank 
was in a sound condition; (c)  the bank’s proposals had been misun- 
derstood; it was ready to pay into the state treasury $145,000, $154,000, 
$152,000, or $400,667, depending upon which of the four proposals was 
accepted. The stockholders  had  some additional bait  with which to 
tempt the state: “As banks must necessarily increase with our growing 
population and industry; we are willing should the legislature wish that 
at the end of every four years the state may subscribe two hundred 
thousand dollars to the Philadelphia bank at par, and dispose of the 
same, for the sole emolument of the cornmon~ealth.”~~ 
On January 27 the House, in committee of the whole, reported against 
the Maclay resolution and recommended that a committee bring in a 
bill of incorporation for ten years under the terms of the bank’s first 
proposal. The report was adopted fifty to thirty-five, and on January 
31 a bill was introduced and read the first time.55 
In the form in which it was reported with amendments by the com- 
mittee of the whole and ultimately adopted, the bill required the Phil- 
adelphia Bank to pay a cash gratuity of $135,000 to the state for a ten- 
year charter; the state was privileged to subscribe $300,000 by paying 
that sum in 6 percent stock of the United States (but if the bank should 
fail, the United States stock was to be retransferred to the state); the 
state had the right to subscribe an additional $200,000 at par at the end 
of four years and a like sum at the end of eight years; and, whenever 
required by the governor, the bank was obligated  to lend the com- 
monwealth $100,000 at 5 per cent for any period not exceeding ten 
years. 
When the second reading of the bill was reached in the House, the 
Bank  of  Pennsylvania approached the legislature  with an offer of  a 
$100,000 interest-free loan for one year, to be repaid in 6 percent stock 
of the United States, at par, provided the Philadelphia Bank was not 
granted a charter before the next session of the Assembly. Postpone- 
ment was urged to give the Assembly time to make inquiries concerning 
the injury  already done the Bank  of  Pennsylvania, which would  be 
aggravated  by  the incorporation  of a new  bank,  and to permit  the 
representatives to consult their  constituent^.^^ 
The Bank of Pennsylvania’s efforts to block the bill in the House 
were fruitless; the bill progressed through its second reading unevent- 
fully and was finally passed by a vote of forty-five to thirty-fi~e.~’ 
The Senate ordered a second reading of the House bill for February 
21. Residents of Lancaster borough and county presented a petition 
expressing regret that the bill had passed the House: “Reflecting  on 14  Anna J. Schwartz 
the extensive interest which the state holds in the Bank of Pennsylvania, 
they cannot too seriously consider the probable baneful effects of an 
additional chartered Bank at this period, on the fiscal concerns of the 
state and on the banking  The next day a petition by Lan- 
caster residents favoring the chartering of the Philadelphia Bank was 
read. A letter from the Bank of Pennsylvania to the legislature con- 
firmed the offer made ten days earlier of an interest-free loan for a year 
and, in addition, proposed another scheme to reward the state if  the 
bill to incorporate the Philadelphia Bank was postponed. Though the 
Bank of Pennsylvania calculated the monetary value of  its new offer 
to be $440,000,59  the legislature was apparently no more pleased than 
it had been with the offer embodied in the bill chartering the Phila- 
delphia Bank; perhaps not so much,  since the Bank of Pennsylvania 
attached many conditions.60  Despite attempts to amend the House bill, 
the Senate passed it without change by a vote of thirteen to ten.61  The 
legislature thus supported an expanding and competitive banking sys- 
tem, which existing institutions perforce had to accept. 
1.4 
Once the Philadelphia Bank had been incorporated, opposition to 
the creation of rivals steadily dwindled. Even while it lasted, the ex- 
isting institutions did not try to tie the hands of a new bank  by ob- 
structive tactics.62  Committees appointed by each bank conferred upon 
subjects of common interest; e.g., they fixed the values at which foreign 
coins would be taken after September 1804. And by cooperative action 
the banks made possible the multiple expansion of credit on a given 
specie base. 
The argument that additional competition would diminish profits was 
once again advanced in  1807-8  when the fourth bank, the Farmers’ 
and Mechanics’, appeared on the scene. Unlike the older banks, which 
had been  organized  by  merchants  predominantly,  the Farmers’ and 
Mechanics’ Bank was founded by a mixed group-merchants,  manu- 
facturers, and mechanics.63 The older banks appealed to the selfish 
interest of the commonwealth itself in their profits in the hope that it 
would deny the new bank a charter. The emptiness of the argument 
became obvious when business expanded-there  was enough for all. 
Thus in approving one of seven offers to remunerate the state, together 
with the Farmers’ and Mechanics’ Bank’s petition for incorporation, 
the House committee on banks  remarked in  1808 that the  Bank of 
Pennsylvania was not injured by the Philadelphia Bank, nor was either 
of them affected by the operation of the Farmers’ and Mechanics’ Bank 
as an unincorporated association.64 Moreover, the business drawn to 
banks of adjoining states did not reduce their profits. 15  The Beginning of Competitive Banking in Philadelphia 
The offer of  monetary inducements for the granting of a charter, 
which began as a voluntary solicitation of the legislature, came to be 
looked upon as a necessary accompaniment of a petition for incorpo- 
ration.  The committee reported that,  since the petitioners sought a 
charter for profit-making purposes, the state had a right to require a 
payment for the privileges it conferred. 
The rationale of a competitive banking system was also elaborated. 
The banking system, being once introduced, (its) evils, if  they have 
any real existence, will probably find their most effectual remedy in 
the rivalship which an increase of the number of banks to a proper 
extent is calculated to create. . . .  An extravagant emission of bank 
paper will be prevented by the fear of being called upon for specie, 
and partiality in the distribution of loans, destroyed by the anxiety 
each will feel to secure to itself the best customers. And if  (which 
no former experience seems to warrant) there was real ground to 
apprehend that a bank might, by extending or withholding accom- 
modations, acquire a power over the conduct and independence of 
individuals, the danger would, perhaps, be best counteracted by a 
fair competition, depriving the several institutions of the ability to 
command custom, and obliging them to merit and attract it by their 
conduct.  6s 
The incorporation of the Farmers’ and Mechanics’ Bank by the Act of 
March 16, 1809, heralded the coming of a decade of unlimited increase 
in the number of Pennsylvania banks. 
1.5 
Between  1784 and  1809 Philadelphia banks moderated their resis- 
tance to competition. The oldest successfully opposed the formation 
of any state-chartered rival during the first ten years of  its existence 
but managed to adjust itself to the conditions created by the opening 
of the national bank in  1791 and, two years later, of a bank in which 
the state was the largest stockholder. It discovered that it could prosper 
despite, or perhaps with the help of, the newcomers. Opposition to the 
charter of additional banks did not, however, cease. In 1803-4  it was 
led by the state-supported bank. But expanding trade proved too strong; 
by  1809 the restrictive drive had collapsed. 
The privilege of banking was not to be confined to one or two large 
institutions. A competitive unit-banking system seemed more desirable 
both to businessmen and the state. New bank incorporation provided 
them with profitable investment outlets. The state, moreover, favored 
a unit-banking  system because  the grant of a charter served as an 
opportunity to secure a payment for the valuable right conferred. Dis- 16  Anna J. Schwartz 
satisfaction on the part of groups of businessmen with the loan policies 
of existing institutions also encouraged the formation of rival banks. 
Increments to the country’s specie supply, which the carrying trade 
yielded, reduced the tensions of bank competition that Robert Morris 
and  Hamilton  had  pictured.% A  new  bank  was  a  source of  specie 
deposits, which extended the basis of loans for the whole system, not 
a threat. The issue of monopoly or competition in commercial banking 
became extinct. 
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